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Britain's Secret Service

After the Second World War Britain built up a ramified secret service system. The leading role in it is played by the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) which engages in world-wide espionage, "psychological warfare" and ideological subversion. The activity against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries is conducted by its biggest department and the most experienced agents. In the developing countries the Secret Intelligence Service engineers plots, coups and other anti-government actions with the aid of the local reactionary forces.

A top secret organisation, Special Political Actions (SPA), was set up within the SIS in the mid-1950s for such subversive activity. SIS Ordinance No. C (102) 56, which has since found its way into the press, said the SPA was set up to organise coups, clandestine radio stations and subversive activities, publish newspapers and books, wreck international conferences or run them, influence elections, etc. In 1969 the SIS was placed in the charge of the Foreign Office. It maintains numerous agencies abroad and its members masquerade as diplomats, correspondents, businessmen, employees of British firms, and so on.

Military reconnaissance is directed by the intelligence department of the Ministry of Defence. Electronic reconnaissance is headed by the so-called Government Communication Centre which operates under the control of the Foreign Office. The Centre monitors foreign broadcasts, intercepts radar beams, deciphers codes, etc.

The counter-intelligence functions are exercised by the Security Service, which is called MI-5. It has organised quite a few anti-Soviet actions and forged documents to whip up anti-communist hysteria. Last autumn it took part in the provocative campaign against Soviet officials in Britain. It also spies on progressive organisations in Britain herself.

The British secret service system is directed by the Cabinet's Joint Intelligence Committee. It summarises the information obtained, gives assignments to the secret services and coordinates their activity. The Committee is made up of representatives of the leading intelligence services and is headed by a high-ranking Foreign Office functionary.

Among the special political actions undertaken by the British secret service one may cite provocations against progressive and peace organisations both in Britain and other countries. It has done its best to prevent normalisation in Europe and hamper the socialist countries' efforts to promote détente.

During the counter-revolutionary events in Czechoslovakia the British secret service encouraged and instigated the anti-socialist elements to step up their anti-government activities.

In its political activity, the British secret service makes good use of British newspapers and radio stations. According to press reports, there are many SIS-paid agents in such newspapers as the *Daily Telegraph*, *Sunday Times*, *Daily Mail*, *Observer*, and *Financial Times*. It has particularly close ties with the BBC, preparing many of its foreign-language programmes.

The British secret service is also very active in col-

lecting information with the aid of electronic reconnaissance and radio interception devices. Besides "passively" monitoring broadcasts, it engages in "active" reconnaissance, like organising flights along the frontiers of socialist countries and sometimes incursions into their air space. Ships are also used for that purpose.

The SIS has a technical operations department which installs bugging devices in other countries' missions and offices abroad. In the process of Operation Contrary A, the British installed such a device at the Polish trade mission in Brussels. A microphone was mounted in a Soviet diplomat's flat in Denmark. The conversations of a Czechoslovak export official in Cairo were listened to. One might also recall in this connection that the British secret service participated together with the American secret service in building a 600-metre long tunnel from West Berlin to the communications lines of the Soviet Military Command in the GDR territory.

The British secret service makes wide use of all kinds of international contacts for purposes of espionage. Among those it employed, for instance, was a representative of English Electric who had made several trips to the Soviet Union. It also recruits tourists. Last year the Soviet security forces detained several motoring tourists from Great Britain who were caught photographing military installations. A number of British tourists were detained when attempting to smuggle anti-Soviet literature into the country.

While the British secret service activity against socialist countries dates back some fifty years, its struggle against the national liberation movement has been going on for centuries. It is especially active in the Middle East. British agents are inciting strife and splitting the Arab countries fighting against Israeli aggression.

Such are only some of the activities the British secret service engages in in close contact with the secret services of the United States and other imperialist countries.

E. VLADIMIROV

Books

A General's Mind

SWORDS AND PLOWSHARES.

By Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor.

(Norton, 434 pp., illustrated, \$10)

Reviewed by
Stuart H. Loory

The reviewer, a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, is co-author of "The Secret Search for Peace in Vietnam." He is currently writing a book on the American military establishment in the post-Vietnam War era.

Here's a book that tells you just what makes a Joint Chief tick, a book that is a clear self-revelation of a senior military man's life, thought processes, and perception of his times.

It's an honest book but, to one interested in the demilitarization of American foreign policy, a discomfoting one. It's a frank book but, to one convinced that our service leaders must be soldier-statesmen in fact as well as title, it reveals the difficulty of fusing those two functions successfully.

To begin at the end, Taylor sums up 47 years of public service by taking a look at the future. He foresees the United States entering a new Cold War period as a declining power. He writes:

"A first step is to recognize the new Cold War technique directed against the sources of our power as a formidable threat to our national security. This form of threat is not new in its weapons—propaganda, subversion, power seizures by minorities. But the acuteness of the threat is new because of the increasing strength and boldness of the internal revolutionary movement and the mind-numbing power of press and television in their effect on the critical judgment of the public. This threat strikes at the roots of national power, particularly at our national unity, with a force that makes us an easy target for all ene-

mies, large and small, foreign and domestic. To cope with it, we need a new concept of national security, broad enough to assure that defensive measures are taken against subversion in this form . . ."

As a declining power, he says, the United States can either adjust its international goals downward, as did Great Britain, or it can continue to maintain its war-making capacities for all-out as well as limited war. He issues this caveat, however: if the nation ever again gets involved in limited war the President should obtain a declaration of war from Congress and then go all out to achieve the goal. "The resources allocated and their use in combat should be limited only by the requirements of prompt victory," he writes.

All of this is gloomy stuff, particularly as it comes from the urbane, articulate, widely traveled linguist who was chosen in the early 1960s to be the number one soldier on the New Frontier.

In 1972, Taylor reveals himself as a man given to views somewhat to the right of Spiro T. Agnew. On just one matter, that of the press's role and performance in recent years, Agnew's criticism appears moderate in comparison with Taylor's.

Schooled in the Old Army of pre-World War II, seasoned as a combat commander and high-level staff man in Gen. George C. Marshall's Pentagon and Dwight D. Eisenhower's European Theater, Taylor came into his own during the Korean War. To use today's vernacular, he had all his tickets punched to perfection.

His was an exciting career: he parachuted into Normandy as a Division Commander on D-Day; he made a secret trip behind enemy lines to negotiate with the post-Mussolini government the

possibility of landing the 82nd Airborne Division near Rome to defend that city against the Germans.

It was also an important one. He served as superintendent of West Point and Berlin garrison commander under President Truman; as 8th Army Commander in Korea and Army Chief of Staff under Eisenhower; as chairman of the Joint Chiefs under John F. Kennedy; and as Ambassador to Saigon for one crucial year under Lyndon B. Johnson.

Taylor is a man who clearly did his homework—arriving in Korea in 1953 to take over field command of all United Nations troops there, he had a piece of paper outlining the mission as he perceived it; returning to Washington a few years later to become chief of staff of the Army, he had already drafted a new program for the service. And he clearly studied his lessons. For example, he extracts these, among others, from the Korean War:

"A central theme was the importance of learning to use our military resources effectively in limited war . . . In combination the enemy, the terrain and the weather tended to nullify the usefulness of much costly equipment procured during and after World War II in preparation for another world war, presumably to be fought primarily in Western Europe . . ."

"The absence of an enemy air force or navy limited the useful employment of much of our air and naval strength . . . In the absence of a naval adversary, the mightiest warships of the world were obliged to content themselves with bombarding unimportant shore targets hardly worthy of their shells."

One can imagine Generals William C. Westmoreland or Creighton Abrams, Jr., writing such paragraphs in their memoirs a few years from now. Why did not Taylor, who had great influence on Vietnam war policy, work more actively to make sure that Korean War mistakes were not repeated in Vietnam? And one wonders, in considering Taylor's thought processes, why he does not try to explain to his readers—or himself—why weapons should be used at all if the targets are hardly worthy of them.

The point is that while Taylor extracted lessons from his experienced, he gives little indication that he applied them. Another example: In May, 1961, he conducted a post-mortem of the Bay of Pigs invasion that led Kennedy to conclude that the Joint Chiefs

did not give him advice on a broad enough basis. The following October, Kennedy sent him to Vietnam with Walt W. Rostow under orders to determine how best to engineer the rescue from disaster to President Ngo Dinh Diem.

"I was not asked to review the objectives of this policy but the means being pursued for their attainment," Taylor writes. "The question was how to change a losing game and begin to win, not how to call it off."

Even if the President did not specifically ask for views on whether the game was worth winning, does not a soldier-statesman have the responsibility to investigate a question such as that and present his views?

As professional soldier-statesmen, the Joint Chiefs must be more than advisers on, and devisers of, ways to "counter threats." They must also have a deep understanding of just what the threats are. Nowhere in his book does Taylor show an appreciation for the nature of the Communist system he was so busy containing during the last half of his career.

Traditionally, troop command has been a prerequisite for membership on the Joint Chiefs. Why not educate them as well in countries perceived as potential enemies—say, as military attaches or in some other experience-broadening capacity? That should be as indispensable a ticket punch in a soldier-statesman's career pattern as troop command.

A future Joint Chiefs member who had a real first-hand knowledge of the "Communist threat," as did say, "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell, who never became a Joint Chief, would indeed be a refreshing novelty.

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Maintaining an empire—the General explains how

Swords and Plowshares

By General Maxwell Taylor.

Illustrated. 434 pp. New York: W. W. Norton & Co. \$10.

By NEIL SHEEHAN

This book is bad history, but in its own way, a good memoir, for it tells a great deal about Gen. Maxwell Taylor and those other statesmen of the 1960's who led us into the Indochina war. Taylor's account of some of the events of that period, such as the involvement of the Kennedy Administration in the overthrow of the late President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam, is so at variance with the documentary record now available to us in the Pentagon Papers and elsewhere that the kindest description one can give his version is to say that it reflects the wish-think reconstruction of the past in which men of power are prone to indulge themselves in their memoirs.

That kind of factual truth is not, however, what one ought to expect in a memoir. Rather, one would hope to find truths of character, attitude and perspective. Taylor's memoir is filled with enough of these kinds of truths, inadvertently at times perhaps, to make well worthwhile the task of forging through the occasionally stilted language and the bureaucratic detail which interrupt its narrative flow. One emerges from the book seeing more lucidly the realities of the foreign policy of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, in contrast to the illusions we held at the time.

Maxwell Davenport Taylor and his theory of the use of military forces in the conduct of foreign policy came into their own with the Inauguration of John F. Kennedy in January, 1961. Taylor's exemplary military career—born in Keytesville, Mo., on Aug. 26, 1901, he graduated from West Point in 1922, commanded the 101st Airborne Division in World War II and the Eighth Army in Korea—had come to a seeming end in 1959 because of his profound disagreement with the

Eisenhower Administration's nuclear strategy of "massive retaliation."

In "The Uncertain Trumpet," published the year after his resignation as Army Chief of Staff, Taylor had argued his doctrine of "flexible response" — the development of strong conventional forces to enable the United States to conduct limited wars below the nuclear threshold as an effective tool of its foreign policy. In his memoirs, Taylor defines limited war as "rational war" to achieve "national interests," or "a resort to arms for reasons other than survival."

The first task the new President set him to was indicative of the kindred minds Taylor found among the statesmen of the Kennedy Administration and then of President Johnson's. Mr. Kennedy had him take leave from his position as president of the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts in New York to conduct an exhaustive review of the Bay of Pigs fiasco.

To demonstrate what Mr. Kennedy desired from the investigation, General Taylor quotes from the letter of instruction the new President gave him:

"It is apparent that we need to take a close look at all our practices and programs in the areas of military and paramilitary, guerrilla and anti-guerrilla activities which fall short of outright war. I believe we need to strengthen our work in this area. In the course of your study, I hope that you will give special attention to the lessons which can be learned from recent events in Cuba." Mr. Kennedy told Taylor that he hoped the General's report would help by "drawing from past experience, to chart a path towards the future."

As Taylor comments in his memoir:

"There were several interesting points in this letter. One was the almost passing mention of the Bay of Pigs, which was to be the primary subject of our investigation. Another was the broad invitation to make excursions into any aspect of limited and guerrilla warfare, the first intimation I had received of the President's deep interest in these activities later lumped together for convenience under the heading of counterinsurgency."

Neither in Mr. Kennedy's letter, nor in Taylor's memoirs, however, is the question ever addressed of whether the United States should be invading a foreign country in the name of counterinsurgency. That question, Taylor's memoir implicitly makes clear, had already been answered. The object of Taylor's Bay of Pigs investigation was simply to learn how to do it better elsewhere the next time.

And that is the heart of Taylor's memoir. It is the story of a man and his fellow statesmen who, in the psychological atmosphere and through the ideological forms of the cold war were actually engaged in maintaining and enlarging an American empire through the use of force.

Taylor expresses no essential misgiving over the termination of this course in the

Indochina war, with its cost of 55,000 American lives so far, well over \$100 billion and a million to two million Indochinese lives. He believes that President Nixon has a good chance to attain the central American objective of preserving an anti-Communist South Vietnam. He concludes that, "Personally, I would expect the probable gains of victory to exceed its anticipated costs by a substantial margin." His regrets over Indochina relate to how force was applied there and to the lack of stamina the country displayed.

"But even in victory we cannot completely redeem the unheroic image created by many aspects of our behavior in the course of the conflict," he writes. "The record of our violent internal divisions, our loss of morale, and our psychotic inclination to self-flagellation and self-denigration justifies serious doubts as to the performance to be expected from us in any future crisis—an uncertainty which will becloud our prestige and diminish our ability to influence world events as long as it lasts."

He blames the news media and the antiwar movement for much of this "unashamed defeatism" and says they caused unwarranted "demoralization and lack of confidence" even within President Johnson's inner circle.

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Taylor regrets the traditional American suspicion of military power which "leads to questioning the efficacy of military forces as an instrument of policy" and the fact that the Indochina experience will probably deepen this suspicion. Future Presidents, he believes, will also have to utilize the "limited war option" to protect our "many interests abroad which are vulnerable to foreign predators. They include the lives and interests of our citizens, our trade and investments, and our Armed Forces and their bases."

His counsel to a future President who resorts to limited war is to avoid the "gradualism" that characterized the Johnson Administration's strategy in Vietnam and to apply force with maximum vigor. He particularly singles out "the restrained use of our air power" against North Vietnam as a model not to imitate in the future.

"A proper concept of limited war," Taylor writes, "is one in which the objectives are limited to something less than the total destruction of the enemy but which carries no implication of curtailed resources or restricted tactics. The resources allocated and their use in combat should be limited only by the requirements of prompt victory." How this is to be achieved against an agricultural country like Vietnam without finally making the population itself the target of the bombs is a question that Taylor does not address.

He also advises a President who decides upon limited-war first to obtain a declaration of war or emergency from Congress so that the President can "silence future critics of war by executive order" and avoid the dissent that hampered the Johnson Administration.

In his concluding chapter, Taylor warns that the technique of subversion developed by Communist powers, as part of their so-called Wars of Liberation has now been extended to the United States itself. "This effort to split and defeat us is now in progress, based not on guerrilla warfare but upon the exploitation of our own internal weaknesses coupled with the abuse of such revered democratic practices as freedom of press, speech and dissent."

"To cope with it," he concludes, "we need a new concept of national security broad enough to assure that defensive measures are taken against subversion in this form. Surely the defense of our national unity merits a dedication of effort at least equal to that which we have lavished in the past on the protection of our overseas possessions, our coastlines, and our air-space from overt foreign foes."

And so in General Taylor's memoirs, one comes full circle from the creation of an American empire in the course of seeking to defend our liberty against the perceived threat of Stalinist Communism, to the counsel that we must now sacrifice our liberties in order to maintain our empire. ■

An old Asia hand doesn't tell it all

In the Midst of Wars

*An American's Mission
to Southeast Asia.*

By Maj. Gen. Edward Geary Lansdale.

Illustrated. 386 pp. New York:

Harper & Row. \$12.50.

By PETER ARNETT

Before the Vietnam war turned sour and Americans could still believe in legends, there was an idealized cold-war warrior whose bravery, boldness and common sense were carrying the American Way to victory over Communism in Southeast Asia.

His legendary exploits and style became the model for the scores of young American operatives dispatched by various departments and agencies to that arena of big-power political intrigue. Like the idealized cold warrior himself, those operatives were armed with a moral certitude about their mission. It sustained them through the long hot nights in backwaters like Luang Prabang and Pakse cultivating minor princelings. And it justified their support of the shoddy political accommodations that passed for democracy in Bangkok, Saigon and Vientiane.

Then it all started to go bad. Deeds once thought bold and daring now seem to have been blundering acts of miscalculation that sucked the United States into an unforgiveable bloodletting in Vietnam.

Those who had a hand in shaping the recent history of Southeast Asia, however, feel differently from the average American about that history. One such man is the model cold-war warrior of them all, Edward Geary Lansdale. Novelists have tried to put him between covers; Graham Greene made a kindred idealist the antihero of "The Quiet American," and he was later featured as the hero of "The Ugly American" by William Lederer and Eugene Burdick.

Now, the 64-year-old Lansdale, former San Francisco advertising man, oriental kingmaker, frustrated, counterinsurgency expert, speaks for

himself with, "In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia." But he remains as elusive as the legends, even after 378 pages, and the reason seems to be that his memoirs are strangely abbreviated; the narrative concluded with President Ngo Dinh Diem firmly in power in Saigon in 1956, the second Asian monarch helped to the throne by Lansdale. The first was Ramon Mag-

saysay of the Philippines. But with all we know of the later dramatic developments of the war, and with all Lansdale knows, his memoirs are like reading a history of the American Civil War that ends with the first election of Abraham Lincoln to the Presidency.

The record states plainly that in 1960 Lansdale wrote a bitterly negative report on the way the war was going in Vietnam, and later discussed his finding with President Kennedy who wanted to send him back to Saigon in a high position. But top Kennedy aides intervened because of his bureaucratic crockery breaking and independence. This same reputation apparently forced his retirement from the United States Air Force with the rank of major general at the age of 55. But none of this appears in his memoirs.

But if Lansdale is reluctant to evaluate his life's work or discuss his personal reverses, he has plenty more to say. His pages ring with the evangelistic anti-Communist rhetoric of the 1950's. Lansdale, an O.S.S. officer in World War II, remains an idealist who believes that the United States can prevail in distant, underdeveloped lands if she exports "the American way," a composite of "winning the hearts and the minds of the people" and expert leverage of American economic aid.

The former operative made plenty of enemies in his freewheeling days as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's personal emissary in Indochina, but he names none in his memoirs, preferring to rail against the "back rooms of Washington policy makers," which are "too full of articulate and persuasive practitioners of the expedient solution to daily problems, of the hoary art of power politics, and of the brute usages of our physical and material means."

Lansdale's belief is probably sustained because of his first and lasting counterinsurgency success, the crushing of the Huk rebellion in the Philippines. He teamed with the then unknown Ramon Magsaysay, secretary of national defense, and mounted a drive against the Communist Huks that demonstrated superb coordination of political, military and social-psychology strategy and tactics. This dramatic campaign, which he details minutely in his memoirs, destroyed the Huks and led Magsaysay to the Presidency in 1953, with Lansdale's help.

By then Lansdale had become America's Number One counterinsurgency expert, and John Foster Dulles sent him to Vietnam to do the same there. In the Philippines Lansdale had a favorite maxim, "Dirty tricks beget dirty tricks," and in Vietnam he was given every opportunity to put his skills to use; his mission, among other things, was to launch paramilitary operations and political-psychological

warfare against North Vietnam a few days after the Geneva accords gave that country to Ho Chi Minh.

Lansdale's operatives were the first American fighting men in Vietnam, a fact not hitherto known until the Pentagon Papers last year revealed minute details of sabotage in Hanoi by Americans in 1954, including the pouring of contaminants into Hanoi buses to eventually destroy them. Lansdale mentions the teams in his memoirs, but he fails to include the contaminants, or his association with the Central Intelligence Agency revealed by the Pentagon Papers.

Lansdale's main contribution to the history of Vietnam was his success in propping up Ngo Dinh Diem, the obdurate Vietnamese nationalist appointed Prime Minister by the French in a power play in 1954 and saved from political extinction by Lansdale who saw in him the makings of another Magsaysay. Dulles, in April, 1955, had already agreed to a demand by his special envoy in Saigon, Gen. J. Lawton Collins, that Diem be dumped in favor of a coalition of Saigon politicians and sect leaders, when a dramatic cable arrived from Lansdale stating that Diem was successfully surviving a military

coup. Dulles changed his mind, and Lansdale helped Diem to victory in a Presidential election.

But Diem was not a Ramon Magsaysay, and this was becoming clear to Lansdale as in his daily meetings with the roly poly President he saw the trappings of democracy fall away to reveal a tightening dictatorship. The special operative was not even informed of Diem's disastrous decree banning the traditional village self-government elections in favor of appointed leaders. "The disbelievers of this world may find it incredible, but I learned of this decree only long after I had left Vietnam," Lansdale writes.

In a postscript, Lansdale writes of the overthrow of Diem in 1963, which he viewed from Washington, and says, "the coup and murders in Saigon seemed incredible." But the irony of that remark, one of the many ironies of America's Vietnam venture, is that the generals who so brutally overthrew Diem were the same who had fought to place him in power. And the American C.I.A. agent relaying the winning play from rebel headquarters was none other than Lansdale's former top aide and Hanoi saboteur Maj. Lucien Conein, who had worked closely with Lansdale on that busy day in April, 1954, when Diem's ascendancy to power was clinched. The lesson seems too obvious to restate: We were out-intrigued. ■

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Super Spy, Strange Ally

Books

GEHLEN: Spy of the Century. By E. H. Cookridge.

(Random House, 402 pp., illustrated, \$10.00)

THE GENERAL WAS A SPY: The Truth About General Gehlen and His Spy Ring. By Heinz Hohne & Hermann Zolling. Introduction by Hugh Trevor-Roper and Preface to the American Edition by Andrew Tully.

Reinhard Gehlen was a first Vlassov's propaganda Nazi general with an obsessive hatred of communism who may have had more influence on the course of the Cold War than any other man. Soviet articles refer to him as a fascist warmonger who was the biggest single factor in the prevention of an East-West detente. These two books tell his extraordinary story.

From late 1941 to the end of the war Gehlen was Hitler's chief of intelligence for the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. Then, having arranged to be captured by the Americans, he soon emerged as the principal source of CIA intelligence from the communist world until 1955, when he became Chancellor Adenauer's chief of intelligence for the West German Republic.

Gehlen was one of the planners of "Operation Barbarossa," the 1941 German attack on the Soviet Union, which sent Nazi divisions six hundred miles into the U.S.S.R. in seven weeks, placing 50 million Russians under Hitler's rule. When Gehlen became chief of intelligence for the Eastern Front, he immediately began organizing a Russian Army of Liberation among anti-Communist prisoners of war and partisans. By the spring of 1943 he had organized this army under Soviet Gen. Andrei Vlassov, who had been captured by the Germans and turned against Stalin. Vlassov and Gehlen estimated that there were hundreds of thousands of anti-Communist Russians prepared to join with the Germans in the overthrow of Stalin.

But Gehlen's plans ran head-on against Hitler's view that the Slavs were sub-human beings who should be kept in terror and mass execution. At

first Vlassov's propaganda leaflets promising good treatment to deserters and employment in the Vlassov movement produced massive defections, but soon Hitler's ruthless treatment of the Russians brought an end to that. Had Hitler not been a maniac, it is conceivable that Gehlen's plans would have provided the basis for a German victory in the East, certainly a substantial prolongation of the war.

Gehlen remained loyal to Hitler, but seeing how the war would end he made plans for his future. He arranged to have all his intelligence files on the Soviet Union packed in 50 steel cases and hidden away until he could be captured by the U.S. Army. As Stalin's aggressive program in Eastern Europe, the Balkans and Iran began to unfold, it was apparent to the Americans that they were totally unprepared, without intelligence about the Soviets. But Gehlen was prepared and had soon negotiated a remarkable deal in Washington giving him authority to establish an all-German intelligence apparatus with complete control over its personnel.

In the little village of Pullach outside of Munich in a large housing development formerly for SS officers, Gen. Gehlen built a walled-in headquarters for what was soon to become the spy base of the Cold War, providing the CIA with 70 per cent of its intelligence on the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. Thus, in a matter of months Hitler's chief anti-Soviet spy had become the Soviet expert for the United States.

There can be little doubt that the Soviets, fearing the Germans more than any other nation, were influenced in their assessment of

The reviewer, a former Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and a specialist on international communism, is a consultant, writer and lecturer on foreign affairs.

U.S. policy by the fact that Gehlen was selected for this role. But there can be little doubt too that given Stalin's aggressive moves the U.S. would use the only available source of intelligence. Probably the revisionist historians of the Cold War will be debating for years the essence of the conclusion E. H. Cookridge reaches in his book: "Whether we like it or not, Western democracy must be prepared in times of danger to accept such strange allies as Reinhard Gehlen in defense against totalitarianism."

According to Cookridge, who is a British author of many fine books on espionage, the CIA pumped over \$200 million into the Gehlen organization. But the results more than paid off. Among its sensational exploits were the accurate forecasts of the East German uprisings in 1953, the Hungarian revolt in 1956, and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Gehlen secured the text of Khrushchev's secret speech denouncing Stalin, and gave it to Allen Dulles. His intelligence operations exposed some of the most successful Soviet secret agents. His plans led to the 600-yard tunnel the CIA dug into East Berlin, where the main telephone trunk lines leading to Moscow and other capitals in Eastern Europe were tapped for nine months until this incredibly successful operation was discovered. In June, 1967, CIA Director Richard Helms was able to make high marks from President Johnson by prediction the exact date of the six-day Israeli attack in the Middle East. His source: Gen. Gehlen.

It wasn't until he became head of German intelligence that Gehlen began to have doubts about the Communists' successes. The Communists be-

came more effective in penetrating his organization and planting fake information. But the greatest blow to Gehlen was the discovery in 1962 that his chief of counter-intelligence, Heinz Felfen, was a Soviet double agent. The Felfe Affair, combined with changes in German political leadership and the new technology of spy planes and satellites all contributed to the fading impact of Gehlen. He retired in 1968 at 65.

Gehlen probably was the "spy of the century," but his rightist proclivities and rigid anti-communism probably contributed to prolonging the most dangerous period of the Cold War and may have slowed the evolutionary political process in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. A proponent of revolution not evolution, he believed that all communism was bad and dreamed of war between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. He had no sympathy for national communism, Titoism, and revisionism. He didn't seem to believe that the political process in Moscow and Eastern Europe would allow for a struggle for power between the rightist Stalinists and the anti-Stalinist revisionists. Even after the advent of Khrushchev his operations continued to give weight to the arguments of those Communist leaders who most feared the Germans and who were most opposed to relaxing the Stalinist tactics of tyranny and terror.

Both of these books are lively reading, well documented and cover essentially the same events. The Cookridge book is better organized and better written, but spy buffs may enjoy the operational detail of "The General Was A Spy" by Hohne and Zolling, two German newsmen who write for Der Spiegel.

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More CIA Meddling

Americans seem to be the last to learn what the Central Intelligence Agency is up to, and now they are learning about the CIA's role in Cambodia from a Cambodian who had a part in it.

Prime Minister Son Ngoc Thanh told a British interviewer, before attaining his present post, that the United States paid millions of dollars after 1965 to train his own rebel troops. He said CIA agents assigned to him ("they have three names a month," he added) assured him of help if the existing government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk were overthrown and the rebels came under left-wing attack.

The government was overthrown, in 1970, and that led to a leftist counter-attack joined by Sihanouk, and that in turn led to a massive American-South Vietnamese invasion of Cam-

bodia. So the Southeast Asia war engulfed Cambodia, as it had Laos, where the CIA also was involved with its private army. The results of all this meddling have been to spread a war without gaining a vestige of victory. If the meddling alone were not bad enough, the disasters following it made it worse.

So far the CIA seems to have done better in its strictly intelligence operations than in its paramilitary and covert actions, but not even Congress knows for sure. Congress might be expected to approve a standing proposal to require that the CIA report to it as well as to the Executive branch.

Instead, Congress is voting what amounts to a blank check, and getting reports on Central Intelligence Agency activity through the prime minister of Cambodia.

CIA Role Bared in Sihanouk Ouster

Dispatch News Service, the source of the following article, was the first news agency to disclose details of the killings at My Lai, South Vietnam.

By RICHARD A. FINEBERG

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WASHINGTON.—The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) played a crucial role in encouraging the coup that toppled Prince Norodom Sihanouk and plunged Cambodia into the Indochina war, according to Cambodia's recently named prime minister, Son Ngoc Thanh.

Describing Sihanouk's overthrow in a series of interviews last year with Oxford University scholar T. D. Allman, Thanh said that CIA agents promised they would do "everything possible" to help if the Cambodian plotters successfully mounted a coup and then found themselves under attack by pro-Sihanouk and Communist forces.

Shortly after the March 1970 coup, Thanh's own forces, trained by U.S. Special Forces in Vietnam, were dispatched by plane to Phnom Penh, where they played a vital role in defending the Cambodian capital for Gen. Lon Nol.

THE WHITE HOUSE maintains that the U. S. had no prior knowledge of the coup and that "no American military or civilian officers" were ever involved officially or unofficially with the plotters. Sihanouk's ouster "surprised no nation more than the United States," President Nixon said after the coup.

Sen. Mike Gravel (D., Alaska) said on Tuesday that White House denials of U. S. involvement in the 1970 coup are "incredible" and he called for full disclosure of the U. S.



PRINCE SIHANOUK
 . . . toppled by CIA

role in Cambodia prior to the coup.

"It is incredible to take the position—as the White House has done—that the U. S. conducted continuous clandestine incursions into Cambodia, hired and trained members of a sect avowedly dedicated to Sihanouk's overthrow, and still did not know that a coup was being planned," Gravel said.

ALTHOUGH THE Sihanouk regime was faltering, Gravel said, "It is doubtful that the prince could have been overthrown without clandestine U. S. support for the coup."

According to Son Ngoc Thanh, CIA agents assigned to Thanh's staff were kept aware of developments concerning the coup including secret meetings between Thanh and aides of Gen. Lon Nol.

At that time, Lon Nol was Sihanouk's prime minister, while Thanh, who had been sentenced to death by Sihanouk, headed a rebel sect known as the Khmer Serei ("Free Cambodia") from a jungle post near the Vietnam-Cambodia border.

According to Thanh, beginning in 1965 the U. S. paid "millions of dollars" to train, arm and support his forces, most of whom were recruited from the Cambodian minority living in South Vietnam's Delta region.

Thanh told Allman, who was

on assignment for the (Manchester) Guardian, that in 1969 a U.S. agent assigned to Thanh's staff gave assurances that the U.S. would support a two-pronged invasion of Cambodia by Thanh's partisans.

THE PLEDGE, Thanh said, came from a CIA operative identified only as Fred. "They have three names a month," said Thanh referring to his American collaborators. "We never knew their real names."

The plan, Thanh said, was "to penetrate the country" from the South Vietnam and Thai borders. "Our hope was that the Cambodian army would rally to us. We would negotiate with Sihanouk, to avoid bloodshed. He could either leave the country or agree to become a constitutional monarch."

Large-scale Khmer Serei defections to the Cambodian government were reported in 1969 and may have been part of Thanh's invasion plan to overthrow Sihanouk. According to reliable sources, the repatriated Khmer Serei units were serving in the royal army under Lon Nol and spearheaded political demonstrations in Phnom Penh just before the coup.

Thanh's invasion plan was shelved — "overtaken by events," as Thanh put it — early in 1970 when Lon Nol's aides sought Thanh's support in the event of a coup.

THANH TOLD Allman that Lon Nol's officers asked him "If the Vietcong attack Phnom Penh the way they attacked Saigon in 1968, could Lon Nol expect the help of Son Ngoc Thanh's forces in defending the capital?"

After checking with his "American friends," Thanh committed his U.S.-trained and financed forces to the Lon

Nol coup. The CIA, he said, promised that the U.S. would do "everything possible" to help.

The 63-year-old Thanh was named prime minister by the ailing Lon Nol on March 21. A devout Buddhist and an early Cambodian nationalist leader, Thanh was prime minister for a brief period in 1945 when he staged a coup prior to the Japanese surrender. He was quickly arrested by British occupying forces, however, and exiled to France.

Thanh returned to Cambodia in 1951 and joined the militant Issarek (Independence) movement. At that time he allied with the Communist Vietminh to oppose Sihanouk, whose strategy of cooperation with the French to achieve independence was too moderate for the militant nationalist.

From that time until the March 1970 coup, Thanh engaged in anti-Sihanouk guerrilla efforts from rural Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam.

In July 1970, Thanh returned to Phnom Penh to become an adviser to Lon Nol. By that time, Cambodian leftists had become allied with Sihanouk and Vietnam Communist forces to fight Lon Nol, the combined U. S.-Saigon forces had swept into Cambodia, and the war that had raged on its borders for two decades finally engulfed Cambodia.

5 APR 1972

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Congress and C.I.A.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee conducted hearings last week on a bill requiring the Central Intelligence Agency to provide the appropriate Congressional committees with the same intelligence analyses it regularly furnishes the White House. This legislation, introduced last year by Senator Cooper, ought to be expedited in the interests of strengthening the machinery of foreign policy.

As Congress reasserts its rightful role in the foreign policy process, it is essential that its members be as fully informed as possible. The respective Congressional committees are entitled to share the fruits of intelligence-gathering operations for which the American taxpayer is billed up to \$6 billion annually. These fruits include assessments which sometimes sharply challenge Executive policies, as the Pentagon Papers revealed.

There is ample precedent for Senator Cooper's proposal. A former C.I.A. official testified last week that the agency has been furnishing highly classified intelligence on world atomic developments to the Joint Atomic Energy Committee for fifteen years, with no security breaches. Even now, senior agency officials provide oral briefings to other committees on request but only with White House approval. Congress could better discharge its own constitutional responsibilities in the foreign policy field if it had full and direct access to this information.

Beyond the Cooper bill, it is high time Congress revived its languishing effort to establish closer scrutiny of intelligence operations. In a move designed to sidetrack legislation with this aim, the Foreign Relations Committee in 1967 was invited to send three members to the C.I.A. joint briefings held by the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, which are currently responsible for overseeing intelligence activities. But no meetings of this group were called during all of last year—an "oversight" of frightening dimensions.

It is not enough for Congress to know what the C.I.A. is saying. It is also essential that at least key members of the legislative branch, which provides the funds for worldwide intelligence-gathering and other undercover operations, keep informed about what, in general, this secret arm of the United States Government is doing.

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Sleuthing for Clues About Russia in Space

By GEORGE SHERMAN
Star Staff Writer

No subject of modern times combines more romanticism and frustration for the layman — at least for this layman — than man's exploration of space.

The romance comes in the inevitable fascination with pioneering adventures in conquest of the unknown. The frustration sets in when the work-a-day civilian sits down and tries to decipher the multitude of technical detail which sustains the space adventure.

Here is where this book makes a welcome contribution. It is comprehensible, scholarly yet thoroughly readable. Mr. Daniloff has set himself a dual task — not only to

THE KREMLIN AND THE COSMOS. By Nicholas Daniloff. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 258 pages, \$6.95.

write about the space age in simple readable prose, but also to unravel the carefully guarded secrets of the Soviet contribution to that age.

AS A RESULT, he has accomplished a notable first — a book which sets in perspective the "space race" of the 1960s between the American and Soviet superpowers, by tracing the Russian efforts from their origins in the late 19th century to the present day.

It was not an easy task. The author makes unmistakably clear with numerous examples that he considers himself more

the expert sleuth in search of clues than a straightforward researcher of published documents.

"The book is less a chronicle or a pleasant narrative than an effort to strip away layers of secrecy and uncover some beginnings," concludes Mr. Daniloff in his prologue.

"Some might argue that it has been a chancy effort because of the relative paucity of available information. I would claim the opposite: the mystery has made the search all the more compelling."

The author is well qualified to conduct the search. Born of Russian parents in Paris, he later spent six years in Moscow during the 1960s as a correspondent in the United Press International Bureau. Having studied at both Harvard University and later at Oxford University, he therefore has the academic, cultural and writing background to meet the challenge of his subject matter.

For the average American, names like Konstantin Eduardovich Tsiolkovsky, the 19th century space theorist born in old Russia and destined to be the father of the Soviet drive into the cosmos, come as a revelation. More to the point for modern times, perhaps, Mr. Daniloff spends a long chapter — based on painstaking research — identifying the Chief Designer of the space program under Khrushchev — Sergei Pavlovich Korolyov.

THE BOOK devotes much space to Soviet-American rivalry in space, from the immediate postwar effort by Stalin to gain and perfect offensive ballistic missile power to the all-out race for the moon in the 1960s. Mr. Daniloff shows how the Russians combine military, scientific and political imperatives in their space effort.

Most interesting of all, he returns constantly to the Soviet ambivalence over whether to compete with President John F. Kennedy over a manned-landing on the moon. It is the author's thesis that Khrushchev wanted to take up the challenge, that he pressured Soviet scientists to create the wherewithal for landing a Soviet man on the moon first, but that Soviet rock-etry was simply not up to the task.

By the late 1960s, concludes the book, the Soviet leadership

under Kosygin and Brezhnev had retreated from Khrushchev's more grandiose schemes and had definitely settled on automatic devices for exploring heavenly bodies, confining the activities of cosmonauts in space to work on a manned orbital station.

The book ends on a cautious note of hope. While the U.S. and the Soviet Union were unable to establish any real cooperation in the early phases of national competition in space, the author finds signs that the two giants are now settling down to less spectacular programs of exploration.

With this more sober assessment of costs and capabilities is dawning the realization that both sides have more to gain from cooperation than rivalry. Mr. Daniloff does not offer any dramatic shifts today or tomorrow — he merely suggests that the imperative of reason, which his book embraces, may ultimately triumph.

2 APR 1972

Congress and the CIA

No more useful piece of foreign-policy legislation has been drafted since Congress got its dander up than Senator Cooper's bill requiring the Central Intelligence Agency to share its reports "fully and currently" with the military and foreign-affairs committees on Capitol Hill. "I contend," said Mr. Cooper, opening hearings, "that the Congress, which must make decisions upon foreign policy and national security, which is called upon to commit the material and human resources of the nation, should have access to all available information and intelligence to discharge properly and morally its responsibility to our government and its people." Meaning to end the practice of arbitrary CIA briefings, he would require the CIA to keep Congress as well as the Executive informed, just as the Atomic Energy Commission and Defense Department have been required to keep the Joint Atomic Energy Committee informed in that field since 1946.

It seems to us Mr. Cooper is quite right to regard the CIA—at least, that largest part of it concerned with intelligence—not as a beast needing to be tamed, as many of its critics do; not as a baby needing to be coddled, as most members of the congressional "oversight" committees do; but as an agency of disinterested specialists providing a necessary and valuable product, intelligence, which Congress has reason and right to share. Such an approach accords with the CIA's known capabilities and it accords as well with the political realities: efforts to tighten legislative oversight have traditionally failed.

Mr. Cooper has taken an undogmatic approach to such essential questions as what part of the CIA

paper factory's product should be made available, by what procedures, with what security arrangements, and so on. He hopes to avoid a constitutional challenge, noting that since Congress created the CIA, it can direct it to share its output. No substantial question of executive privilege is involved, in his view, since Congress would not be asking for the advice the President receives from his lieutenants but for the information on which the advice is based. Further hearings will explore these sub-issues.

The overriding point remains that Congress cannot make good decisions if it does not have good and timely information. The CIA is the logical place to look: it is charged with collating all intelligence produced within the government and, unlike the Executive departments which deal in the critical fields of weapons, military aid or arms control, it has (in those fields) no operational responsibilities and hence no incentive to shape its intelligence to fit its own departmental programs. The exemplary record of Congress in dealing with atomic energy makes it untenable to claim that Congress can't keep secrets. Anyway, everyone knows that it's the Executive branch which does most of the leaking. Regular provision of CIA information to Congress would probably tend to limit the practice of self-serving Executive leaks.

We trust the President will look sympathetically upon this bill introduced by one of the most responsible and experienced members of his own party and realize its potential advantages to the Congress and to the nation as well.

NEW REPUBLIC

1 APRIL 1972

CIAid

Senator Edward Kennedy released March 19 a "sanitized summary" of the third in a series of reports he had asked the General Accounting Office to write him on the effectiveness of US humanitarian aid to Southeast Asia. The summary, "sanitized" to purge secret information contained in the full report, deals primarily with medical aid to Laos through the Agency for International Development (AID). Unavoidably it stumbles on something that has long troubled Kennedy and his staff on the Senate refugees subcommittee: the slipperiness of federal budget statistics when they have anything to do with the Indochina war. Two years ago the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings that publicized AID's link with the Central Intelligence Agency; AID's director, John Hannah, publicly admitted that since 1962 his agency had subsidized CIA activities in Laos and provided a front for secret agents.

As chairman of the refugees subcommittee, Kennedy protested that AID funds were being misspent, and in May 1971 he got a letter from Hannah saying that "at the beginning of fiscal year 1972, all of the AID financing with which you have been concerned will be terminated." As the latest GAO reports shows, the government had responded to an over literal interpretation of Kennedy's protest and had left the Laos arrangement virtually unchanged. The CIA would still train its secret army in Laos; it would still work out of AID offices and rely on AID for logistical and medical support. But beginning with the new fiscal year on July 1, 1971, the CIA would reimburse AID for services rendered. Technically, AID ceased to subsidize the CIA, but in every other way it remained a front and a supplier.

The GAO report given to Kennedy, a classified document, shows how this new system works. According to *The New York Times*, the report states that the CIA has already refunded \$1.3 million to AID for medical assistance during the first half of fiscal 1972, and that more than \$1 million will be refunded for the second half—a total of about \$2.5 million a year spent by AID on the CIA army in Laos. The conclusion is that either AID is overspending its budget to accommodate the CIA (which is unlikely), or that \$2.5 million originally appropriated for humanitarian aid is being diverted to back up the CIA's army. Only the bookkeepers know how the financing is arranged.

To a State Department spokesman, the whole issue is a "non-story" because this "cost-sharing agreement" between AID and the CIA was announced almost a year ago. Furthermore, he believes that it's nearly impossible to distinguish between humanitarian and military aid in Laos where the soldier-tribesmen are accompanied by their families. In any case, what was true before Kennedy made his protest is true now: the CIA's appropriation of \$2.5 million for humanitarian aid in Laos (\$4.9 million in 1972), about

half of it (\$2.5 million) goes to support the secret war. Judging from reports last week, the secret war may be coming to an end no matter what Congress does: the base of CIA operations in Laos, Long Cheng, has been abandoned by about 1000 local volunteers who were recruited to defend it against the North Vietnamese. A US spokesman in Vientiane said the situation at the base is "critical and rapidly deteriorating." If it falls, it will be the farthest south the Communists have reached in Laos.

PROVIDENCE, R.I.
BULLETIN

E - 149,463
APR 1 1972

CIA Information

One of the recurring criticisms of the Central Intelligence Agency is that despite the hundreds of millions of dollars it spends to gather information, the distribution of that information is so limited that Congress has little benefit from it. A remedy for this gap has been proposed by a former CIA official, Dr. Herbert Scoville Jr., once deputy director for research, has suggested that the same intelligence and analyses be supplied to appropriate congressional committees as now goes to the White House. He argues that while much information is provided by the executive branch to Congress, it is subject to distortion by administrative officials.

There are two aspects of such a development that raise questions. One is the issue of security. But Dr. Scoville pointed out that CIA intelligence has been submitted regularly to the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy for years, as required by statute, without any breaches of security. The other is the danger of congressional members being overwhelmed with a mass of information.

To solve the latter problem, another former CIA official, Chester L. Cooper, proposes that representatives of the CIA be assigned to the congressional committees to screen out the important material and bring it to their attention. The material wouldn't

be available to everybody, but only to those committees dealing with foreign affairs and national security.

In a period when Congress is insisting that it be given a larger voice in the direction of foreign policy and those activities likely to involve the United States in international conflict, it is vital that its members be fully informed. In the recent past, the accumulation of power in the White House has left Congress all too often in the dark or able to obtain only what information the executive feels it should have.

Many critics in Washington feel that the CIA and its activities should be controlled directly by the State Department, except perhaps for clandestine activities, which should be directed separately. There have been many indications in the past decade that the CIA operates independently of the State Department and, as a result, has a tendency to make its own foreign policy. While the State Department's state of eclipse is such today that it is scarcely in a position to assert greater control over the CIA, increased reporting to Congress might at least keep Congress in closer touch with the realities of power in the federal government and enable it to make sounder decisions on policies to be followed by both agencies.

**IN THE MIDST OF WARS:
An American's Mission
to Southeast Asia**

by Edward Geary Lansdale
Harper & Row, 386 pp., \$12.50

Reviewed by Jonathan Mirsky

■ With the exception of the Pentagon Papers, Edward Geary Lansdale's memoir could have been the most valuable eyewitness account of the internationalizing of the Indochinese war. Lansdale, a "legendary figure" even in his own book, furnished the model for the Ugly American who, from 1950 through 1953, "helped" Magsaysay put down the Huk revolution in the Philippines. He then proceeded to Vietnam where, between 1954 and 1956, he stuck close to Ngo Dinh Diem during Diem's first shaky years when Washington couldn't make up its mind whom to tap as the American alternative to Ho Chi Minh. Lansdale's support insured Diem as the final choice for Our Man in Saigon. While the book's time span is, therefore, relatively brief, the period it covers in the Philippines and Vietnam is genuinely important.

There is only one difficulty with *In the Midst of Wars*: from the cover to the final page it is permeated with lies. That Harper & Row finds it possible to foist such a package of untruths on the public—and for \$12.50!—several months after the emergence of the Pentagon Papers, and years after the publication of other authoritative studies, exhibits contempt for a public trying to understand the realities of our engagement in Vietnam.

The lie on the jacket describes Lansdale merely as an OSS veteran who spent the years after World War II as a "career officer in the U.S. Air Force." In the text Lansdale never offers any explicit evidence to the contrary. Indeed, on page 378—the last of the text—he states that at the very time Diem was being murdered in Saigon, "I had been retired from the Air Force."

For all I know Lansdale drew his pay from the Air Force and, as the photographs in his book attest, he certainly wore its uniform. This is irrelevant. Lansdale was for years a senior operative of the Central Intelligence Agency; on page 244 of the Department of Defense edition of the Pentagon Papers, Lansdale, two other men, and Allen Dulles are identified as representing the CIA at a meeting of the President's Special Committee on Indochina held on January 22, 1954.

Why is this important? Because if there is one word Lansdale uses repeatedly it is "help"—and he uses it personally, simulating a Lone Ranger-like urge to offer spontaneous assistance. Thus, the first day he ever saw Diem, "... the thought occurred to me that perhaps he needed help. ... I voiced this to Ambassador Heath. ... Heath told me to go ahead." The informal atmosphere continues when Lansdale, upon actually meeting Diem, immortalizes him as "the alert and eldest of the seven dwarfs deciding what to do about Snow White."

Further desires to serve inform Lansdale's concern for the "masses of people living in North Vietnam who would want to ... move out before the communists took over." These unfortunates, too, required "help." Splitting his "small team" of Americans in two, Lansdale saw to it that "One half, under Major Conein, engaged in refugee work in the North."

"Major" Lucien Conein, who was to play the major role the CIA had in the murder of Diem in 1963, is identified in the secret CIA report included by the *Times* and Beacon editions of the Pentagon Papers (see SR, Jan. 1, 1972) as an agent "assigned to MAAG [Military Assistance Advisory Group] for cover purposes." The secret report refers to Conein's refugee "help" as one of his "cover duties." His real job: "responsibility for developing a paramilitary organization in the North, to be in position when the Vietminh took over ... the group was to be trained and supported by the U.S. as patriotic Vietnamese." Conein's "helpful" teams also attempted to sabotage Hanoi's largest printing establishment and wreck the local bus company. At the beginning of 1955, still in Hanoi, the CIA's Conein infiltrated more agents into the North. They "became normal citizens, carrying out everyday civil pursuits, on the surface." Aggression from the North, anyone?

Lansdale expresses particular pleasure with the refugee movement to the South. These people "ought to be provided with a way of making a fresh start in the free South. ... [Vietnam] was going to need the vigorous participation of every citizen to make a success of the noncommunist part of the new nation before the proposed plebiscite was held in 1956." Lansdale modestly claims that he "passed along" ideas on how to wage psychological warfare to "some nationalists." The Pentagon Papers, however, reveal that the CIA "engineered a black psywar strike in Hanoi: leaflets signed by the Vietminh instructing Tonkinese on

over of the Hanoi region in early October [1954] including items about property, money reform, and a three-day holiday of workers upon takeover. The day following the distribution of these leaflets, refugee registration tripled."

The refugees—Catholics, many of whom had collaborated with the French—were settled in the South, in communities that, according to Lansdale, were designed to "sandwich" Northerners and Southerners "in a cultural melting pot that hopefully would give each equal opportunity."

Robert Scigliano, who at this time was advising the CIA-infiltrated Michigan State University team on how to "help" Diem, saw more than a melting pot:

Northerners, practically all of whom are refugees, [have] preempted many of the choice posts in the Diem government. ... [The] Diem regime has assumed the aspect of a carpet bag government in its disproportion of Northerners and Centralists ... and in its Catholicism. ... The Southern people do not seem to share the anticommunist venemence of their Northern and Central compatriots, by whom they are sometimes referred to as unreliable in the communist struggle. ... [While] priests in the refugee villages hold no formal government posts they are generally the real rulers of their villages and serve as contacts with district and provincial officials.

Graham Greene, a devout Catholic, observed in 1955 after a visit to Vietnam, "It is Catholicism which has helped to ruin the government of Mr. Diem, for his genuine piety has been exploited by his American advisers until the Church is in danger of sharing the unpopularity of the United States."

Wherever one turns in Lansdale the accounts are likely to be lies. He reports how Filipinos, old comrades from the anti-Huk wars, decided to "help" the struggling Free South. The spontaneity of this pan-Asian gesture warms the heart—until one learns from Lansdale's own secret report to President Kennedy that here, too, the CIA had stage-managed the whole business. The Eastern Construction Company turns out to be a CIA-controlled "mechanism to permit the deployment of Filipino personnel in other Asian countries for unconventional operations. ... Philippine Armed Forces and other governmental personnel were 'sheep-dipped' and sent abroad."

Elsewhere Lansdale makes much of Diem's success against the various sects, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen. (At every step Diem was ad-

moment, even holds the weeping Chief of State in his arms.) Everything depends on timing, daring, and honesty in the face of venality. Therefore Lansdale ridicules a Frenchman who dares accuse him of bribing the sects. Actually, in the literature on this subject, the only argument about bribes has been about their magnitude. Bernard Fall estimated that American bagmen disbursed more than \$12-million. John Osborne, in *Life*, May 13, 1957, also put the amount in the millions, while Joseph Alsop, in the *New York Herald Tribune* of April 1, 1955, cautiously guessed in the hundreds of thousands.

Although at the end of *In the Midst of Wars* Lansdale says that he regrets Diem's "brutal murder," he makes no mention of the CIA's central role in the affair. And he immediately lies again by claiming: "I had been shunted from Washington work on Vietnamese problems in 1961 and had been busy with other duties." Unfortunately for Lansdale and Harper & Row, the Pentagon Papers reveal him, in 1961, as very busy indeed with precisely such problems—briefing his superiors on CIA activities in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. The CIA being the kind of organization it is, perhaps there was for Lansdale no "need to know" that his old subordinate, now "Colonel" Conein—at the behest of Lodge, Bundy, Rusk, and John Kennedy—had been instrumental in the coup that brought Diem to a bloody end in the back of a truck.

But why should Lansdale have the last word? The Defense Department's analysts knew that Diem's shortcomings were more profound than the kind of stubbornness which made him so exasperatingly lovable to Major General Lansdale.

As far as most Cochinchinese peasants were concerned, Diem was linked to Bao Dai, and to the corrupt, French-dominated government he headed. Studies of peasant attitudes conducted in recent years have demonstrated that, for many, the struggle which began in 1945 against colonialism continued uninterrupted throughout Diem's regime: in 1954, the foes of nationalists were transformed from France and Bao Dai, to Diem and the U.S.—My-Diem, American-Diem, became the universal term of Vietcong opprobrium—but the issues at stake never changed.

Jonathan Mirsky is director of the East Asia Center at Dartmouth College.

SPY TEAM LOST IN U.S. GUNSHIP

By JOHN DRAW
in Saigon

NORTH VIETNAMESE surface-to-air missile (S A M) crews have shot down an AC130 gunship with 14 Americans aboard said to be on an "intelligence mission."

They were probably highly-trained personnel whose job is to observe and determine the significance of the flow of Communist men and material to southern front lines.

A second gunship was shot down by anti-aircraft fire over Laos but the 15 men aboard parachuted to safety and were rescued after a night in the jungle.

The S A M "kill," in the Tchepone area, was the first deep inside Laotian territory. It was the first confirmed case of North Vietnamese S A M presence below the 17th parallel, which divides North and South Vietnam.

Major victory

North Vietnamese gunners, rocket and mortar crews launched a massive bombardment—the heaviest for four years—on South Vietnamese villages and outposts south of the demilitarised zone.

The barrage, which ended early yesterday, killed 32 Government soldiers and civilians and wounded more than 100. Government troops were forced to withdraw from five of their bases.

NEWPORT NEWS, VA.
PRESS

M - 48,828

S - 74,643

APR 1 1972

CIA Data-Sharing

Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) complains that the Senate can hardly carry out its foreign policy role adequately unless it receives up-to-date information on relations with other countries and he is not satisfied with the data which seeps down from the executive branch, so he is pushing an amendment to the 1947 National Security Act that would require the Central Intelligence Agency to keep the Senate and house Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees "fully and currently" posted.

The White House looks upon this proposal as an attempted encroachment on the responsibilities of the secretary of state and raises the question of whether it would violate the constitutional requirement as to separation of powers. Behind this argument is the fear that once Congress started getting hold of secret intelligence data there would be no end to it. While Senator Cooper said the legislation "would not affect in any way or inquire into the intelligence gathering activities of the CIA, its methods, sources, funds or personnel," that is a portal which an element in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee wouldn't mind entering.

However, this and other relevant congressional committees do need access to the best current data on matters which they hear testimony on and debate and it is a disadvantage to have to rely on the executive branch.

A constructive way out of the impasse was offered this week by a former senior CIA employee in committee testimony. He said it would be advisable for the agency to give information and analysis on a continuing basis and proposed that a staff of "carefully" chosen officers be designated to provide liaison, adding that the mind boggles at the thought of truckloads of classified documents being delivered to the Senate and House.

There is no reason why such a system should have to pose any of the dangers that have been raised directly or implicitly in response to the Cooper bill. Of course Congress would want to satisfy itself that the officials chosen were just as aware of its needs as the desires of the executive side of government, within the realm of recognition that the CIA can serve security needs best only by remaining as essentially a secret operation.

Chilean Panel to Probe Charges Against ITT

United Press International

The Chilean Chamber of Deputies formed a special commission yesterday to investigate alleged efforts by International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. to prevent the inauguration of President Salvador Allende.

Business Week magazine, meanwhile, said former CIA Director John A. McCone has confirmed that ITT executives discussed possible moves to prevent Allende from taking office, the Associated Press reported.

McCone, a member of the ITT board of directors since 1966 and a member of its executive committee, disclosed that he was consulted and that ITT told the U.S. government, "If you have a plan, we'll help with it," Business Week said yesterday.

The 13-member Chilean panel is to report within 60 days on charges by American columnist Jack Anderson that ITT had tried to block Allende from taking power in December 1970.

Frei Nephew Heads Panel

The chamber committee is composed of seven opposition legislators and six members of Allende's popular unity coalition of Socialists, Communists and left splinter groups. The panel's chairman is Arturo Frei, a Christian Democrat and nephew of former President Eduardo Frei, Allende's predecessor.

According to Anderson, Eduardo Frei rejected ITT overtures to prevent Allende's inauguration.

Foreign Minister Clodomiro Almeyda told the chamber he had received photocopies of documents made public by Anderson in Washington purporting to show ITT involvement in Chile's internal affairs.

Memos 'Were Staff'

Of the memos published by Anderson, McCone said, "those were staff," Business Week reported. An earlier ITT statement dismissed as baseless allegations that the company plotted against Allende to protect its properties in Chile against expropriation.

Business Week reported that McCone said suggestions of "economic repression" measures against Chile were "prudently, properly and firmly rejected" by ITT Chairman Harold S. Geneen.

McCone was quoted as saying that he and Geneen regret "the way that the memos were written and the way they have been read by the press so that our true policy has been distorted."

31 MAR 1972

CHILE'S CONGRESS SETS C.I.A. INQUIRY

**I.T.T. Role Another Target
but Doubt Is Voiced**

By JUAN de ONIS

Special to The New York Times

SANTIAGO, Chile, March 30 —The Chilean Congress has decided to investigate past activities of the United States Central Intelligence Agency and the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation reportedly aimed at keeping President Salvador Allende Gossens from taking office in 1970.

Both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies called for the investigation after Hernán del Canto, Minister of the Interior, had reported on what he said was a plot by retired military officers and a small, right-wing opposition party to overthrow Dr. Allende last week.

The investigation will be conducted in the Chamber of Deputies. However, the anti-Marxist Opposition, which controls the Congress, questioned the evidence the Government has presented on both the C.I.A. activities and on the supposed plot.

The main opposition party, the Christian Democrats, announced that in protest it would organize a march open to "all democratic parties." The march, it said, would also serve to demonstrate opposition to the refusal by Dr. Allende's left-wing Government to authorize a march by women 10 days ago and another by private organizations Tuesday.

While Congress agreed to an investigation of the C.I.A. in Chile, a court of appeals released on \$82 bail the president of the Fatherland and Liberty movement, Pablo Rodríguez Grez, a lawyer who was accused by the Government prosecutor of fomenting the plot last week.

A retired general, Alberto Green Baquedano, and two retired junior army officers are being held in the plot, which the Government has said called for the assassination of Dr. Allende.

The investigation of the C.I.A. and the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, which has large investments here, stems from purported I.T.T. documents made public by Jack Anderson, the syndicated Washington columnist.

The documents, which suggest that I.T.T. employees, some of whom were in contact with the C.I.A. in Washington, tried unsuccessfully to promote a military coup to keep Dr. Allende from taking office, have caused a political storm here.

Ex-C.I.A. Director Cited

John A. McCone, a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has confirmed that executives of International Telephone & Telegraph Corporation had discussed moves against President Salvador Allende Gossens of Chile, the magazine *Business Week* said today.

Mr. McCone, now a member of the I.T.T. board of directors and its executive committee, was quoted as saying he had been consulted and that the company had told the United States Government that if it had a plan to block the election of Dr. Allende, "we'll help with it."

Far from disavowing the authenticity of the memorandum published by Mr. Anderson, Mr. McCone said they were written by I.T.T. staff members, according to *Business Week*.

I.T.T. spokesmen have denied as "without foundation in fact" allegations that the company had planned or participated in any plots against Dr. Allende in an effort to protect its properties in Chile against expropriation.

ITT and CIA

Perhaps it was not entirely surprising, given a long history of dollar diplomacy in Latin America, that an international corporation such as the International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. would have tried to exercise its own foreign policy in Chile, or have attempted to enlist Administration and Central Intelligence Agency support. After all, ITT had big holdings threatened by the election of President Allende. But *Newsweek* magazine mentions another point that has probably not occurred to many Americans, which is that ITT's telephone network in Chile "was an invaluable resource to spies as well as stockholders." Maybe that represented a kind of interlocking relationship. It is unlikely, however, to show up in reports to stockholders.

A Matter of Intelligence

Diplomatic dealing and higher-level statecraft often require attentive alertness, but it has sometimes happened that even the most astute leaders outsmarted themselves because they underestimated their own intelligence.

Successive recent Presidents of the United States, for instance, either discounted or downgraded perceptive professional intelligence estimates about Vietnam—the dismal details are fully recorded in some of the Pentagon papers—and it is clearly lamentable that some of the more prescient counsel went no further than the files.

There are many such reasons why the Central Intelligence Agency's anal-

yses of various foreign policy problems should be more widely accessible, and some of the organization's unhonored prophets seem to agree. Former director John A. McCone is apparently speaking for them as well as himself in supporting a pending bill that would provide key Congressional committees with CIA estimates and even some special surveys.

Since the American public is paying for this advice, its representatives are fully entitled to more than a fleeting look, and it is quite possible that far better informed Congressional opinion would result—whatever the prevailing view at the White House.

29 MAR 1972

DATA TO CONGRESS FROM C.I.A. URGED

Two Ex-Agency Aides Back Bill to Require Reports

By BENJAMIN WELLES

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 28—Two former officials of the Central Intelligence Agency urged Congress today to require the agency to provide it fully and currently with the same intelligence and analyses it now regularly provides the White House.

Dr. Herbert Scoville Jr., a former Deputy Director for Research, noted that for 15 years the agency had been supplying the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee with highly classified intelligence on world atomic developments. There have been no security breaches, he said.

Dr. Scoville also suggested that regular briefings of Congressional committees dealing with foreign affairs would enhance—not jeopardize—national security.

At present, he said, both Congress and the public are dependent on the Administration for information, which is often "distorted" to suit Administration policies.

Would Screen Information

Chester L. Cooper, a former senior analyst on Vietnam for the agency and now an executive of the Institute for Defense Analyses here, urged that selected agent officers with experience on the National Security Council staff be assigned tours of duty with Congressional committees dealing with foreign and national security affairs.

These officers, he suggested, would screen what was important for Congress and thus prevent its being "drowned" in a flood of intelligence material—much of it irrelevant.

Mr. Cooper also urged Congress to seek access to National Security Council study memorandums which, he noted, include not only intelligence but also other pertinent information relevant to policy decisions.

Dr. Scoville and Mr. Cooper testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which was opening hearings today on a bill proposed by Senator John Sherman Cooper, Republican of Kentucky.

The measure, sponsored in the House by Representative Paul Findley, Republican of Illinois, would oblige the agency to provide Congressional committees dealing with armed services and foreign policy "fully and currently" with both intelligence information and evaluations affecting foreign relations and national security.

Senior agency officials provide frequent oral briefings on world affairs at the request of Congressional committee chairmen, but these briefings are expressly sanctioned by the White House.

With the exception of the Atomic Energy Act, there is no legislation that requires the agency to disclose its operations or its findings to Congress.

Access by Hill To CIA Data Recommended

By Stanley Karnow
Washington Post Staff Writer

Two former senior employees of the Central Intelligence Agency urged yesterday that selected congressional committees be provided regularly with CIA information and analysis concerning U.S. foreign relations and "matters of national security."

The ex-CIA men, Chester L. Cooper and Herbert Scoville Jr., testified at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing convened to discuss a bill introduced by Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) to amend the National Security Act of 1947.

The bill, a variation of previous congressional efforts to supervise the U.S. intelligence community, calls for the CIA to "inform fully and currently" the Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees of the House of Representatives as well as the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees.

Speaking in defense of his proposal, Sen. Cooper said that it "would not affect in any way or inquire into the intelligence gathering activities of the CIA, its methods, sources, funds or personnel."

Its main purpose, the senator explained, is to give Congress "access to all available information and intelligence" so that the legislature can "discharge properly and morally its responsibility."

The Nixon administration has voiced its hostility to the bill in a State Department letter sent in January to Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), the Foreign Relations Committee chairman, saying that requiring the CIA to inform Congress is "incompatible" with the Secretary of State's role as principal foreign policy adviser to the President.

The State Department letter, described by Fulbright as "about as weak a letter as I've

Congress "would raise a constitutional question as to separation of powers between the Legislative and Executive Branches."

Chester Cooper, 55, a veteran of the CIA, the State Department and the White House, who now works for the Institute of Defense Analyses, recommended yesterday that a special staff of "carefully" chosen officers serve as liaison men between the CIA and the congressional committees.

He warned against Congress demanding access to all intelligence studies, saying that "the mind boggles at the thought of truckloads of classified documents being delivered daily to the Senate and House mailroom."

The former CIA employee therefore suggested that Congress be authorized to receive the National Security Study Memoranda, an eclectic set of documents that contain a wide array of information and interpretation of current policy options.

The other committee witness, Scoville, 57, formerly the CIA's Director of Science and Technology, asserted that the administration has deliberately misused intelligence in its presentations to Congress to promote its own legislation.

Scoville alleged that administration spokesmen in 1969 sought to justify the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile program before Congress by reporting that the Soviet Union would soon acquire a "first-strike capability" that demanded endorsement of the U.S. program.

Disputing the administration argument that intelligence briefings raise a "Constitutional question," Scoville said that the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee has been performing that

Both former CIA men cautioned the committee against having Congress provide the public with information given to its committees by the intelligence community.

Sources close to the committee also expressed fears privately that any intention on the part of Congress to release CIA intelligence to the public might result in the defeat of the bill.

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MAR 29 1972

Doubt Congress can defy Nixon on CIA data

By Thomas B. Ross

Sun-Times Bureau

WASHINGTON — Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) and a former official of the Central Intelligence Agency expressed doubt Tuesday that Congress would be able to pry loose the CIA's secret intelligence reports from the Nixon administration.

Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, opened the hearings on a bill that would require the CIA to give its estimates to Congress as well as the White House. After disclosing a State Department letter declaring the administration's opposition to the bill, Fulbright indicated he was pessimistic about the prospects of overriding a Presidential veto.

The first witness, Chester Cooper, a former CIA, White House and State Department intelligence analyst, said he doubted an OK would be forthcoming until the administration was convinced the CIA's secrets would be protected by Congress.

"Frankly," he testified, "I think the Executive does not want you to have this information. Unless the issue is faced squarely, you are going to get very sanitized, thin, harmless information. You'll get a lot of bulk but not much nourishment."

Cooper and Herbert Scoville, former head of the CIA's re-

search division, insisted the administration's fear of leaks was unfounded but, nonetheless, very real.

Scoville argued that the CIA has been providing secret reports to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy for more than 20 years without any leak of security information. But Cooper pointed out that "few of the AEC issues are politically contentious," while most of the Foreign Relations Committee's are.

The bill, sponsored by Sen. John S. Cooper (R-Ky.), is designed to give key Senate and House committees the type of secret information that will allow them to judge whether the President is following the best intelligence advice.

Fulbright said his experience over the last 10 years has been that the "reports of the CIA have proved more accurate than any other estimates."

Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) suggested the State Department opposed the bill because it wanted to make "administration stooges" of key members of Congress.


Church joined Sen. Charles H. Percy (R-Ill.) and the five other committee members present in supporting the bill. But he contended that an even more important issue was how to stop the CIA from "military and paramilitary" operations around the world. He said Congress had never received a

satisfactory answer on the statutory authority under which those operations are conducted.

Percy said the CIA had proved more valuable to him than any other source of secret information but said he was still appalled at how little senators are told about vital questions. He confessed to voting wrong on the supersonic transport and the antiballistic missile because of "fallacious" information.

The State Department letter argued that the bill would undermine the secretary of state's role as the President's chief adviser on foreign policy, violate the separation of powers between the executive and legislative branch and risk violations of security. Fulbright dismissed the department's response as "about as weak a letter as I've ever seen."

Scoville and Chester Cooper agreed on the charge that there was no merit in any of the department's arguments. Cooper went so far as to suggest that the administration was making a "conscious effort to confuse."



EARTH

The CIA put your brother in Vietnam.
CIA heroin traffic turned him on to smack.
You are paying the CIA
\$6 billion a year for these social services.

March 1972

EARTH magazine

His curiosity piqued by Sunset Strip billboard, Diehl investigated the charges with expert on spies, Ladislav Farago.

BOOK TALK

Sniffing Around U.S. Spy Network

BY DIGBY DIEHL

• A sensational billboard on Sunset Strip a few weeks ago caused me to look into the March issue of EARTH magazine with considerable interest—and great skepticism. Another attack on our government within the government, the Central Intelligence Agency, was leveled in a message 48 feet long, heralding an article by Berkeley professor Peter Dale Scott about CIA involvement in heroin traffic in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

Although Scott does not "prove" his charges conclusively, his research is impressive and the bulk of circumstantial evidence as well as peculiar coincidence would certainly lead me, if I were a congressman, to ask just what the CIA is up to running Air America, the largest airline in Southeast Asia, and being inconspicuously conspicuous around the opium triangle. EARTH's editor, Jim Goode, says, "All this is terrifying. It has to be stopped and the only way to stop it is to make the CIA—specifically, its secret unauthorized war in Laos—accountable to the public. When a 'secret' agency is allowed to operate beyond the reach of the law, it becomes a criminal agency."

Goode sounds shrill and unrealistic until you recall weird scenes like the Bay of Pigs and read a few more facts. The CIA employs 18,000 people "directly," only we don't know exactly what 6,000 of them do because they're involved in Clandestine Services. The \$6 billion annual budget of this organization is spent in ways mainly unknown by the American taxpayer . . . unknown, for that matter, by chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee Allan Ellender who says, "It never dawned on me to ask about it."

My curiosity piqued, I talked to the foremost civilian expert on secret intelligence operations, Ladislav Farago, who is also the author of the current best-seller, THE GAME OF FOXES (McKay; \$11.95). Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100008-7

age. "The spying operations of the CIA are a big silly joke: they're all playing Alice in Wonderland games," he says, roaring with laughter like a Hungarian Santa Claus.

"We're spending something like \$2.9 billion bribing prime ministers in Asia and buying armies in Burma and it's all nonsense. Counterinsurgency is not the business of the United States. Nixon would be better served by getting the facts than by the CIA overthrowing governments."

Actually, according to Farago, the CIA and other intelligence operations do have valuable information-gathering services, mostly run by civilian scholars. "These are useful and necessary services: mainly reading newspapers and official reports from other countries. But the rest could be canned. The United States could have a very adequate intelligence operation for under \$100 million. To be informed would be cheap; to play games is expensive."

A comic aspect of the intelligence problem is that even when a spy does come up with information, who knows if he can be trusted? "As I point out in 'The Game of Foxes,' the Germans and the Allies had so completely penetrated each other's information lines with double agents that no one knew what was really happening. Hitler's own men invariably gave him false information because they didn't like him. Of course, they couldn't have known for sure what they were giving him since the British were running the German spy network in England. Then again, the Roosevelt-Churchill hotline was tapped. Sure, a spy can be important—but you never know to how many people."

History proves over and over that the spy game is a waste of time and money, says Farago. "When I worked in naval intelligence in 1935-37, the information published in the New York Times was superior to what was coming through our office. The Korean invasion of June, 1950, wasn't announced to President Truman by our vast spy network; it came over the Associated Press wire. And, of course, the CIA's 'secret' Bay of Pigs was one long farce. Eisenhower turned down the idea in September, 1960, but Allen Dulles (then CIA head) and Richard Bissell (then chief of staff) sold it to Kennedy. It was so cleverly planned that virtually every major news source from the New York Times to the Nation knew about it in advance."

In 1942, Ian Fleming (who was then with British intelligence and went on to write the James Bond

spy novels) had a desk in Farago's Washington office. "Fleming used to rush in and set up shop periodically, always very hurried. But he carried a little sign with him on every journey that he would hang on the wall that I think tells the whole story of espionage: 'Never in the course of human history was so much known about so little by so many.'"